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1Chapter
Security in Wireless Local Area 
Networks (WLANs)
Rajeev Singh and Teek Parval Sharma
Abstract
Major research domains in the WLAN security include: access control & data 
frame protection, lightweight authentication and secure handoff. Access control 
standard like IEEE 802.11i provides flexibility in user authentication but on the 
other hand fell prey to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. For Protecting the data 
communication between two communicating devices—three standard protocols 
i.e., WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy), TKIP (Temporal Key Integrity Protocol) 
and AES-CCMP (Advanced Encryption Standard—Counter mode with CBC-MAC 
protocol) are used. Out of these, AES-CCMP protocol is secure enough and mostly 
used in enterprises. In WLAN environment lightweight authentication is an asset, 
provided it also satisfies other security properties like protecting the authentication 
stream or token along with securing the transmitted message. CAPWAP (Control 
and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points), HOKEY (Hand Over Keying) and 
IEEE 802.11r are major protocols for executing the secure handoff. In WLANs, 
handoff should not only be performed within time limits as required by the real 
time applications but should also be used to transfer safely the keying material for 
further communication. In this chapter, a comparative study of the security mecha-
nisms under the above-mentioned research domains is provided.
Keywords: WLAN security, WEP, WPA, 802.11i, denial of service (DoS),  
lightweight authentication, secure handoff
1. Introduction
Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) provide an extension to the wired net-
work. The wireless stations (STAs) connect to an Access Point (AP) for communica-
tion. The messages involved in the communication between STA and AP are visible 
to other STAs lying in the communication range. This makes WLANs insecure and 
hence WLANs requires protection.
As with any other computer network, the major security goals in WLANs are: 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (termed as CIA triad). Prominent tech-
niques that help in attaining these goals include: access control, authentication, 
encryption, message authentication codes (MAC). Under Access control domain, 
the entity authentication is performed initially. Depending upon the entity authen-
tication results, access into the WLAN network is controlled. For controlling access 
into the WLANs IEEE 802.11i (WPA2) is the main standard [1]. This standard 
though provides flexibility in user authentication but has several issues under 
the Denial of Service (DoS) attacks [2]. For providing protection to individual 
WLAN data frames encryption mechanisms like WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy), 
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TKIP (Temporal Key Integrity Protocol) and AES-CCMP (Advanced Encryption 
Standard—Counter mode with CBC-MAC protocol) are used. Lepaja et al. [3] have 
demonstrated through experiment that WPA with AES provides high TCP through-
put. Also, AES-CCMP protocol provides strong security properties, and hence is 
mostly used in the enterprises [3]. In WLANs, sometimes handoff by the STA is 
required to maintain communication continuity. There exist several protocols like 
CAPWAP (Control and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points), HOKEY (Hand 
Over Keying) and IEEE 802.11r that claim safe and continuous handoff by the STAs 
[4]. These protocols transfer safely the keying material to STA for further com-
munication. The time limit constraint is imposed on such handoff as the handoff 
should be performed within short interval required by the real time applications.
This chapter is further divided into four sections. Section2 discusses access 
control methodologies in WLANs while section3 provides understanding of frame 
authentication methodologies. Section 4 explains secure handoff methods along 
with the requirements of secure handoff in WLAN environment. Each of these 
sections also provides comparative analysis among various methodologies. Section5 
provides conclusions and future directions.
2. Access control
Traditionally, the entity authentication and access control is provided by the 
legacy authentication standard i.e., WEP. It has proved insufficient [2] and is 
hence, deprecated. Currently, IEEE 802.11i (WPA2) [1] security standard is used 
as an entity authentication and access control mechanism. This security standard 
is used to secure data communication over 802.11 wireless LANs. The IEEE 802.11i 
authentication specifies 802.1X authentication mechanism for large networks. The 
4-way handshake follows an 802.1X authentication process to confirm the shared 
keys on Wireless Station (STA) and AP, evolving alongside the Pairwise Transient 
Key (PTK). This key is used to secure the data sessions between STA and AP using 
either Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) or Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) in counter mode with a Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code 
(CBC-MAC) Protocol (CCMP). As per the findings of Asante and Akomea-Agyin, 
use of simple passwords/passphrases makes CCMP susceptible to dictionary attacks 
[5]. The authentication and 4-way handshake are performed sequentially in 802.11i. 
Once STAs are authenticated, the standard evolves fresh secret keys to secure data 
communication over 802.11 wireless LANs. A large numbers of packets are used in 
these processes [2], which results in an increased process length, communication 
overhead and network overhead. The authentication and 4-way handshake both are 
prone to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. This is due to the lack of proper authenti-
cation and insecure message communications between wireless devices [2, 6].
In 802.11i based Networks, 4-way handshake is used for evolving and sharing 
the keys between the two communicating partners. This 4-way handshake is one of 
the major concerns in WPA2/802.11i because of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and 
therefore researchers target to reduce the 4-way handshake latency. Some suggested 
to make it 3-way while other suggested to make it 2-way [7]. One such improvement 
is proposed by Singh and Sharma [7]. In their proposal, the authors try to eliminate 
the entire 4-way handshake while maintaining the security and key refreshing 
requirements. For their purpose, they have utilized frame sequence numbers and 
the striking feature of the proposal is that the key freshness is maintained for each 
communicating frame. The key refreshed is used for fulfilling the security aspects 
like frame encryption and integrity management. The overheads in the proposal 
are bare minimum and it is lightweight as no changes in the existing MAC frame 
3Security in Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs)
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.89857
are done. Also, no extra messages are required. Their improvement is more useful 
under frequent key refreshing situations where users are joining and leaving the 
wireless environment frequently like in a short duration conference/workshop or 
in lounge of railway station/airport. The improved technique provides a secure 
authentication mechanism and no explicit synchronization is required in case of 
loss of frames. The timings analysis done in the work shows that this technique is 
effective while security analysis shows that it enjoys almost equivalent security as 
compared with 4-way handshake of 802.11i. Removal of handshake ensures that the 
attacks conducted in the 4-way handshake are also removed.
Another improvement in the 802.11i standard is proposed by Singh and Sharma 
[8] wherein a novel sequence number based scheme is proposed to reduce the MIC 
field overhead in the WLANs. The existing security frameworks (WPA, 802.11i) 
provide MIC for maintaining the integrity and authentication for each data frame. 
MIC is kept in separate field in the frame, and hence adds to the communication 
overhead. The scheme of Singh and Sharma [8] introduces the notion of authentica-
tion token (AT). This AT is calculated based upon the existing sequence number 
of the WLAN frame. The AT serves both frame integrity and frame authentica-
tion purposes. After calculation, it is placed instead of sequence number in the 
sequence number field of the WLAN frame which means no extra bit or field 
overhead involvements. As MIC field is removed and AT placement requires no 
overheads, the scheme is effective as far as WLAN communication overheads and 
space managements are considered. In addition, the authors have shown that their 
method is resistant against replay attacks and also provided details on how to attain 
synchronization in case of frame loss.
In October 2017, a new and major weakness was documented in WPA2 WLAN 
standard termed as Key Reinstallation AttaCK or KRACK [9]. It was noted that 
this affected all kinds of WLAN security and hence the reputation of WPA2 got 
decreased. The WPA2 standard also suffered under DoS attacks. Hence, Wi-Fi 
Alliance comes up with the improvement. The improvement is termed as WPA3. 
Its main features involve: (1) ease of use (2) natural password selection (3) an 
improved and robust handshake and, (4) forward secrecy. The WPA3 is backward 
compatible with WPA2 which means the upgraded devices can work in WPA2 or 
WPA3 modes [10]. The market adoption of this standard is now picking and it will 
take some more time for getting stabilized. Thus, this work on WLAN security 
considers the present widespread standard i.e., WPA2.
Li et al. proposed an initial entity authentication scheme termed as fast WLAN 
initial access authentication protocol (FLAP) [11]. FLAP is targeted towards making 
access authentication faster by reducing the number of initial authentication mes-
sages. It is assumed in the protocol that STA and AS share common secret key which 
simplifies the entire mechanism. Overall, this method involves 6 messages (approx. 
Two round trip times, Figure 1), proves STA authentication at the AS via shared key, 
has key hierarchy equivalent to 802.11i and protects the messages by MIC. Through 
practical measurements it is shown that FLAP can improve the efficiency of EAP-TLS 
by 94.7 percent. It is suggested that this method is compatible with 802.11i and can 
coexist with existing 802.11i standard. Depending upon circumstances either 802.11i 
or FLAP can be chosen from suite selector. Like standard 802.11i security protocol, 
FLAP scheme also depends upon MIC for frame integrity and authentication despite 
of the fact that MIC verification is computation intensive. This protocol hence may 
fall an easy prey to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks wherein the attacker may send 
large number of frames having incorrect MICs. The successive MIC failures on the 
receiver results in a kind of DoS attack termed as computation DoS attack [12].
Singh and Sharma [13] proposed an access control authentication scheme—
SWAS (Secure WLAN Authentication Scheme). The scheme introduces the concept 
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of delegation in WLANs and provides access to clients only upon authentication. 
SWAS provides authentication of all parties (STA, AP and AS) and evolves a fresh 
key for securing the data sessions. In addition, it provides security to all messages 
by utilizing cryptographic primitives, such as encryption and Message Integrity 
Code (MIC). The proposed scheme reduces the length and complexity compared 
to IEEE 802.11i authentication and key deriving process. The use of cryptographic 
techniques does not increase the authentication time of the proposed method. The 
scheme reduces the communication cost, network overhead and is also resilient 
against DoS attacks. Therefore, the main contribution of SWAS is to provide a secure 
and efficient authentication mechanism that evolves fresh communication keys.
The SWAS scheme involves three parties: STA, AP and AS. It has three phases: 
registration phase, request phase and authentication phase. Initially, STA registra-
tion is performed at AS and is required only once in a given network. In registra-
tion, AS utilizes delegation concept, and generates shared secret key ( σ ) for AS 
and STA [14]. The registration phase is followed by the request phase, where the 
existing 802.11 probe requests, and the probe response messages are utilized by the 
STA to request the network connection and access. After the request phase, SWAS 
authentication is performed for authentication and to derive a new communication 
key that is used to protect the data packets in subsequent sessions.
Both online and offline authentications are used in the SWAS scheme. Online 
authentication provides authentication and security to all messages among STA, 
AP and AS. The online authentication utilizes three random numbers (r1, r2, r3) 
and a sequence number (s1) to ensure proper encryption, authentication and key 
freshness. In addition, it maintains a key hierarchy similar in purpose to 802.11i 
with a Master Session Key (MSK), Pairwise Master Key (PMK) and Pairwise 
Transient Key (PTK). The PTK evolved on the STA and AP during the authentica-
tion process is used to encrypt the data packets between them. A simplified view of 
the SWAS online authentication message exchanges (M1, M2, M3 and M4) is shown 
in Figure 2. In this figure it is clearly visible that each one among STA, AP and AS 
authenticates each other through various passcode/digital signature verification. 
The passcode is nothing but protected information (secured through cryptographic 
means) for the other party. Offline authentication is required whenever a new 
session key between the same STA and AP is required. This does not involve AS for 
authentication rather it uses prior stored information at STA and AP. The offline 
authentication is done via a re-association request and utilizes loosely synchronized 
sequence number scheme [15].
The salient features of SWAS include: (1) Resistance to DoS attacks in almost 
all the phases, (2) Less communication and computation time as compared with 
Figure 1. 
A simplified overview of initial access authentication protocol (FLAP).
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IEEE 802.11i standard, (3) authentication of all the associated parties i.e., STA, AP 
and AS by each other and, (4) authentication of all the messages used during all 
the protocol communication phases. The shortcomings include: (1) lack of practi-
cal demonstration of the protocol and (2) no extension of the scheme under the 
handoff situations is provided till date.
Authentication per frame and symmetric key based encryption is an implicit 
necessity for security in Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs). Singh and Sharma 
[16] proposed a novel symmetric key based Access Control and per frame authen-
tication scheme for WLANs termed as Key Hiding Communication (KHC) scheme. 
KHC scheme has two phases: initial phase and communication phase. Former is 
utilized for sharing and evolving the master key (MK) between STA and AP whereas 
latter is utilized for onwards data frame communication using the (refreshed) 
keys. The major establishment of this scheme is the introduction of novel concepts 
of refreshing the key, protecting the key and initial vector (IV) using different 
counters and then mixing the bytes of protected key and IV together for each com-
municating frame. The mixing is based upon the shared secret key and hence only 
the two communicating parties i.e., STA and AP can mix and separate the bytes of 
key and IV. The protected mixed bytes are termed as codeword while the concept 
of mixing the protected key and IV bytes is termed as key hiding. The codeword is 
added in the WLAN frame. This addition of codeword to the existing WLAN frame 
occupies extra space and hence the scheme has extra space overheads. Integrity 
to the frame is provided via MIC. A new key and new IV for the new frame to be 
transmitted is evaluated based upon existing secret key and existing IV. Evaluation 
of new key and new IV is termed as key and IV refreshing. The refreshed new key 
and new IV are first protected using incremented values of counters and then mixed 
together to form new codeword. The verification and separation of the key and IV 
from the transmitted codeword provides frame authentication. Once the frame is 
authenticated, its integrity is verified through MIC verification involving key. The 
frame authentication is lightweight in KHC as it involves trivial increment, XOR and 
modulus operations. Thus, KHC follows the notion of frame authentication first and 
then checking the frame integrity for protection against computation DoS attacks. 
The separated key and IV are used to decrypt the frame contents and are also used to 
confirm the frame integrity via MIC. The simplified overview of KHC communica-
tion process is shown stepwise in Figure 3.
Figure 2. 
A simplified overview of online authentication phase of SWAS scheme.
Computer and Network Security
6
In nutshell, KHC introduces the concept of key hiding which involves protecting 
the key using counters followed by mixing of refreshed key & IV i.e., mapping of 
refreshed key & IV. Through this process of formation of the codeword, the secret 
symmetric key remains concealed from the attacker. The recipient extracts the key 
from the codeword, compares it with its own evaluated key, thereby authenticating 
the sender. Key along with IV, is then used to decrypt the data frame of the sender. 
Thus, KHC is a useful WLAN communication scheme that is not only secure but is 
also efficient. The major contributions made by KHC are: (1) lightweight WLAN 
communication methodology, (2) utilization of symmetric key based encryption/
decryption, (3) Per frame Key refreshment, (4) protection against computation 
DoS attacks and, (5) comparable security as that of 802.11i.
2.1. Comparisons of various WLAN access control mechanisms
A property wise comparison between prominent WLAN access control security 
mechanism is presented in Table 1. WEP is though deprecated but mentioned here 
for the sake of completeness. It can be noted that WEP provides weak authentica-
tion, integrity and encryption support. Further, WEP does not consider key and 
IV refreshing. IEEE 802.11i is a strong protocol as it maintains strong authentica-
tion, integrity and encryption. It involves large number of messages and hence 
consumes times during initial authentication. For key refreshing, it involves 
4-way handshake having 4 message exchanges between STA and AP. This 4-way 
handshake is the major concern in 802.11i. It is prone to DoS attacks and KRACK 
attacks. FLAP and SWAS both enjoys features similar to that of 802.11i with a dif-
ference that the messages exchanged for symmetric key evaluation are less in FLAP 
and SWAS. In FLAP, very few i.e., approx. 6 messages are exchanged for the key 
evaluation (including those between STA and AP). In SWAS, only four (4) initial 
messages are required during online authentication (including those between STA 
and AP) for sharing the PTK. During offline authentication for refreshing the 
shared symmetric key only two messages are required. The KHC scheme adopts an 
interesting methodology which is different from the other access control protocol. 
Figure 3. 
A simplified overview of communication phase of KHC scheme.
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It does not use any third party like AS in the authentication process and hence 
involves less number of messages. It provides an implicit key hiding per frame 
authentication procedure that is capable of communicating the key to the other 
entity and is able to refresh not only the shared key but also the IV for encrypting 
each frame. Thus, least messages are required for key refreshing among all the 
access control WLAN security mechanisms. Also, the adopted methodology of 
key refreshing, protection and mapping makes the cracking of key difficult for 
the attacker. In contrast to WEP, IV is hidden and not visible to the attacker. Other 
access protocols do not have the notion of IV.
As shown in Table 2, memory requirements of WEP is least. 802.11i has more 
memory requirements than WEP but less than others. Among others, SWAS has 
highest while FLAP has lowest memory requirements. Communication overhead 
analysis shows that (1) KHC and WEP involves per frame overheads whereas in 
others it is done implicitly and, (2) KHC is efficient in key refreshing as com-
pared to others. For key refreshing each of 802.11i and FLAP requires 4 frames, 
WLAN access control—Security mechanisms
Property WEP 802.11i [1] FLAP [11] SWAS [13] KHC [16]
Authentication Yes, weak Yes, strong, 
initial entity 
authentication 
followed by 
MIC based per 
frame auth.
Yes, strong, 
initial entity 
authentication 
followed by 
MIC based per 
frame auth.
Yes, strong, 
initial 
authentication 
followed by 
MIC based per 
frame auth.
Yes, strong, 
initial entity 
authentication 
followed by 
continuous, 
lightweight per 
frame auth.
Integrity 
support
Yes, 
weak, 
CRC 
based
Yes, strong, 
MIC based
Yes, strong, 
MIC based
Yes, strong, 
MIC based
Yes, strong, 
MIC based
Encryption 
support for 
confidentiality, 
strength of 
encryption
Yes, low, 
RC4 
algorithm
Yes, high, TKIP 
and AES based
Yes, high, 
TKIP and AES 
based
Yes, high 
(Once shared 
key is evolved, 
rest process is 
same as that 
of 802.11i)
Yes, high,
any one of 
RC4/ TKIP/ 
AES can be 
used
Synchronization 
Algorithm
No No No No Yes
Initial message 
Exchange for 
symmetric key 
exchange
No, done 
manually
Yes, large Yes, few – 06 
messages (two 
round trip 
times)
Yes, few -only 
four (4) initial 
messages 
during online 
authentication
Yes, few
Key freshness No Yes Yes Yes Yes
IV freshness No N.A.* N.A.* N.A.* Yes
Messages 
exchange for key 
renewal
N.A.* Yes, four, 
explicitly
Yes, four 
(between 
STA and AP), 
explicitly
Yes, two 
using offline 
authentication
No, done 
implicitly
*Not Applicable in this mechanism.
Table 1. 
Property wise comparison of WLAN access control security mechanisms [16].
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SWAS requires 2 frames whereas it is handled implicitly in KHC. In [11], the 
average authentication delays of the EAP-TLS and FLAP are evaluated as 260.253 
and 13.884 ms, respectively. In [13], the total time for SWAS authentication is 
found to be of the order of 26.46 ms (including time for DoS protection). In 
[16] Key refreshing timings of 802.11i and KHC are shown as 13.5 ms and 7.5 ms, 
respectively.
The security comparison shown in Table 3 clearly indicates that SWAS and 
KHC scheme provides almost equivalent and better security. 802.11i is prone to DoS 
attacks whereas FLAP is prone to replay and man-in-middle attacks. Obviously, 
security of FLAP is least and hence it is not much used presently.
In most of the WLAN access control mechanisms (except KHC), authenticity to 
the data frame is usually provided by MIC. The MIC based per frame authentication 
may lead to computation DoS. Hence, lightweight per frame authentication solution 
is required. It is discussed next.
Attacks WEP 802.11i [1] FLAP [11] SWAS[13] KHC [16]
Possibility of frame 
contents overwritten by 
attacker
Yes No No No No
Possibility of modification 
of authentication bits
N.A. as 
authentication 
is implicit
No No N.A.* No
Man-in-middle attack Yes No Yes No No
Replay attack Yes No Yes No No
Reduce DoS attacks No No No Yes Yes
*Not applicable in this mechanism.
Table 3. 
Comparison of WLAN access control security mechanisms under attacks [16].
WLAN access control—Security mechanisms
Overheads WEP 802.11i [1] FLAP [11] SWAS[13] KHC[16]
Memory 
requirements**
Storing 
key 
and IV
Storing 
Master 
Key, 
Refreshed 
key
Storing 
Master 
Key, 
Refreshed 
key and 
counter
Storing delegation 
key, public key pairs, 
Symmetric keys: MK, 
PMK, MSK, PTK, two 
counters, one sequence 
number. (Also pool 
of random numbers 
at AP)
Storing 
Master 
Key, 
Refreshed 
key, IV 
and two 
counters
Communication overheads
For per frame 
authentication
IV (128 
bits) 
per 
frame
Implicitly 
by MIC
Implicitly 
by MIC
Implicitly by MIC/
authentication 
information
256 bits 
per frame
For key refreshing N.A.* 4 data 
frames
4 data 
frames
2 data frames implicit
*Not Applicable in the scheme.
**Considered per participating node.
Table 2. 
Performance comparison of WLAN access control security mechanisms [16].
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3. Frame authentication
In WLANs, a two layer redundant security exists. One at the Medium Access 
Control (MAC) layer while other at the higher layer dealing with End to End security. 
In former, 802.11i provides security while in latter, higher layer protocols like IPSec, 
SSL-TLS etc. provides security. Hence, it is suggestive that lightweight authentication 
and symmetric key based cryptographic measures per frame should be used.
For providing individual frame level protection, two kinds of per frame authen-
tication exist in WLANs: MIC based authentication and lightweight authentication. 
MIC based frame authentication for data frames is utilized by standard WLAN 
protocols like IEEE 802.11i, FLAP etc. In these protocols, each frame is accompanied 
by a unique MIC calculated using sender’s shared secret key. The receiver verifies 
it by recalculating and matching using its share secret key. The MIC calculations 
and verification consume computation time of the order of 1.5 ms and as shown in 
Section 2 for FLAP protocol, computation DoS attacks are a possibility [12, 17, 18]. 
Main reason for computation DoS attack is attributed to the fact that MIC is serv-
ing two purposes: authentication and message integrity. Instead, first lightweight 
authentication should be used. If it succeeds, frame integrity (MIC) should be 
checked only for those frames whose authentication has succeeded. This will reduce 
the DoS attacker chances. Thus, lightweight authentication techniques which uses 
less computation time may prove useful.
The lightweight authentication schemes [19–25] generate the random authenti-
cation bits at sender and receiver using random bit generator with commonly shared 
secret seed as input. These authentication bits are inserted into the WLAN frames. 
Upon verification of the authentication bits, the frame is accepted at the receiver. 
Though such schemes provides authentication but they usually lack other security 
measures like key freshness, secrecy and integrity. A brief tabulation of these 
schemes is presentation in Table 4, showing advantage and disadvantage of each.
3.1. Comparisons of various lightweight authentication mechanisms
All the schemes considered in Table 4 provide per frame continuous authentica-
tion. Schemes of Pepyne et al. [25] and Singh and Sharma [26] supports integrity. 
Former supports CRC based weak integrity while latter supports MIC based strong 
integrity. Schemes of Pepyne et al. [25] and Singh and Sharma [26] supports 
encryption. Former supports RC4 based weak encryption while latter supports 
TKIP/AES based strong encryption. All the schemes considered use their own 
synchronization algorithm, in fact scheme by Wang et al. [22] uses three different 
synchronization algorithms. Schemes by Ren et al. [23], Lee et al. [24], Pepyne et al. 
[25] and Singh and Sharma [26] involves initial message exchanges. Key freshness 
is incorporated by Pepyne et al. [25] and Singh and Sharma [26]. None of these 
involves extra messages for evolving new symmetric key (key renewal).
Considering the memory requirements of these schemes Singh and Sharma 
[26] has the greatest (912 bits) while Lee et al. [24] has the lowest (24 bits). Others 
except Pepyne et al. [25] have 256 bits memory requirements. Pepyne et al. [25] has 
384 bits memory requirements. As far as communication overheads are concern, 
Johnson et al. [19, 20] and Ren et al. [23] have requirements of 3 bits per frame and 
7 bits per ACK frame for counter. Wang et al. [21, 22] has no extra bit requirements 
as these keep the authentication bits in the unused type and subtype fields of 802.11 
frame. Lee et al. [24] requires four extra frames, each having 3 authentication 
bits. Pepyne et al. [25] has requirements of keeping 128 bits per frame for keeping 
counter. ASN based scheme by Singh and Sharma [26] has no explicit requirements 
but requires 48 bits per ACK for synchronization.
Computer and Network Security
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Light weight 
authentication 
schemes
Features Advantage(s) Disadvantage(s)
Johnson et al. 
[19]
Wu et al. [20]
Only one bit from the 
authentication stream 
generator is placed in 
the link layer data frame
• scheme provides 
originator 
sender identity 
authentication
• has low communica-
tion overhead
• as one bit can 
easily be damaged, 
synchronization 
algorithm is also 
proposed
• attack leading to non-
synchronization can easily 
be launched via successive 
frame authentication 
failures
• The number of bits used 
for authentication purpose 
is too less due to which 
attacker has 50% chances
• the data packets are not 
encrypted in SOLA nor 
MIC per frame is provided, 
hence payload may be 
changed (overwrite attack)
Wang et al. [21] • the sender and the 
receiver generates an 
authentication stream 
using same seed value
• The bit from the 
authentication stream 
is put in the frames 
by the sender and 
are verified by the 
receiver using its 
authentication stream
lightweight protocol 
with synchronization 
algorithm and low 
communication 
overhead
• The authentication bits 
are not bound to the frame 
contents
• synchronization process is 
affected by flooding DoS 
attack where the attacker 
confuses the sender via 
unauthenticated ACK 
frames
• long authentication bits 
of continuous 0’s or 1’s by 
attackers in the frames can 
cause confusion
Wang, et al. 
[22]
• single bit lightweight 
authentication 
solution
• Concept of dis-
crimination among 
legitimate STAs and 
attacker nodes is used
efficient in terms of 
computation cost, 
communication cost 
and synchronization 
efficiency
Possibility of authentication 
bit manipulation by attacker 
exists
Ren et al. [23] 3 bit authentication 
solution
Has synchronization 
algorithm that uses 7 
bit counter value put in 
the ACK frame by the 
receiver for attaining 
synchronization
still utilizes less number 
of bits and therefore high 
probability of attacks
Lee et al. [24] Scheme selects 3 bits 
for authentication of 
management frames
Protection from DoS 
attack performed 
by unauthenticated 
management frames
• scheme protects only 
the management frame 
whereas the data frame are 
not protected
• DoS attack is still possible 
by using frames other than 
the management frames
Pepyne et al. 
[25]
• based upon improvis-
ing the WEP protocol
• uses random stream 
generator for generat-
ing the authenticator 
variables and fresh 
encryption keys
Frame counter 
‘k’ is used for 
synchronization 
purpose
attacker can easily modify ‘k’ 
and launch the attack leading 
to non-synchronization and 
Denial of Service
11
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On comparing the computational performance of the lightweight authentication 
schemes mentioned in Table 4, it is found that Pepyne et al. [25] and Singh and 
Sharma [26] take more computational time as compared with others. Singh and 
Sharma [26] takes more computational time due to the fact that it involves MIC 
evaluation and encryption of frame for enhancing the security. It is shown in [26] 
that considering only the authentication the time taken for computational cost for is 
0.5 micro seconds which implies that it is same as that of other lightweight solutions.
Except, Pepyne et al. [25], the chances of Brute Force attacks on authentication 
bits embedded in the frames are quite high in these schemes. Except Pepyne et al. 
[25] and Singh and Sharma [26] the possibilities of frame contents modification, 
man-in-the middle attack, replay attacks and DoS attacks are quite high. Pepyne 
et al. [25] and Singh and Sharma [26] do not allow frame contents modifications 
and DoS attacks. Pepyne et al. [25] suffers under man-in-the middle attack and 
replay attacks.
Though KHC is considered in this chapter initially under the Access control 
mechanisms, it involves lightweight per frame authentication also and needs a 
special mention in this sub-section. In comparison with the schemes mentioned in 
Table 4, KHC has longer initial entity authentication process. KHC also has raised 
memory requirements but meets important security features like forward secrecy, 
key refreshing, lightweight per frame authentication, per frame encryption etc. 
required by any WLAN security protocol.
Apart from the two main authentication types i.e., MIC based authentication 
and lightweight authentication, the others are password key exchange mechanisms 
and layered authentication. The password key exchange mechanisms [27, 28] 
provide mutual authentication between client and authentication server (AS), 
identity privacy, half forward secrecy and low computation cost for a client. These 
mechanisms lack some of the mandatory and recommended requirements for the 
key exchange methods [29]. Also, these schemes provide authentication at the AS 
level only while ignoring the authentication at the AP level. The layered authentica-
tion achieved by EAP which acts as basis for higher layer authentication protocols, 
contains certain vulnerabilities e.g. no identity protection, no protected cipher suite 
negotiation, and no fast reconnection capability [29].
Light weight 
authentication 
schemes
Features Advantage(s) Disadvantage(s)
Singh and 
Sharma [26]
• utilizes sequence 
number of the 
frame along with 
the authentication 
stream generators for 
authentication
• provides authentica-
tion by modifying 
sequence number of 
the frame by trivial 
math operations by 
sender such that the 
modification is veri-
fied at the receiver
• it requires no extra 
bits or messages 
for authentication 
purpose and also no 
change in the existing 
frame format is 
required
• lightweight 
authentication
• helps in protecting 
against computation 
DoS attacks
• prohibits replays 
and maintains the 
synchronization
AP maintains sequence 
numbers per STA
Table 4. 
Comparison of per frame WLAN authentication solutions.
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4. Secure handoff
WLANs handoffs are essential for providing continuous mobility to a wireless 
Station in an Enterprise LAN. Two important requirements of the handoff are: (1) 
establishment of a secure connection of the roaming STA with new access point 
(AP) and (2) completion of handoff within time limits such that the undergoing 
communication remains unaffected. The time limit on handoff for multimedia 
and real time WLAN applications is approximately 50 ms [30]. During this period 
no data packets transfer occurs. As per the 802.11i WLAN security standard, the 
complete secure STA authentication (default Full EAP/TLS) via AS evolving shared 
secret key between STA and AP takes time of the order of 300 ms to 4 s [12] and 
hence is unfit for the handoffs. For reducing this time, notion of pre-authentication 
is introduced wherein full 802.1X authentication involving AS is done utilizing old 
AP and candidate AP (new AP). Hence, at the time of handoff only 4-way hand-
shake is required between STA and candidate AP. In this pre-authentication process, 
an inaccurate candidate AP prediction has associated resource wastage issues as full 
802.1X will again be required [31]. Researchers have considered predictive authen-
tication and proactive key distribution for reducing the handoff times. Former 
involves predicting the candidate AP whereas latter involves locating a group of 
candidate APs. Thus, in former the problem of inaccurate candidate AP prediction 
exists whereas in latter the problem of extra communication overhead for authenti-
cation with group of APs exists.
Researchers have also worked towards reactive solutions wherein the candidate 
AP is selected by STA and then the security context is transferred to this AP. In such 
solutions, STA requests to AS via old AP, then AS transfer security context and 
material to the candidate AP. Singh and Sharma [32] proposed one such novel secure 
handoff scheme that maintains security properties while evolving and transferring 
the security context (key and initial vector) to the candidate AP. The scheme is light-
weight and uses reactive method for handoff. Two kinds of APs are defined in the 
scheme: normal AP and Domain Controller AP (DCAP). STA request DCAP through 
AP by putting ID of the candidate AP. DCAP in turn distributes the STA context 
(key and initial vector) to the candidate AP. Thus, when STA roams into the area of 
candidate AP, less time is involved in the STA authentication at the candidate AP.
For providing fast and secure handoff for the mobile STA in WLANs, standard 
bodies IEEE and IETF have defined protocols like Control and Provisioning of 
Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP), HandOver Keying (HOKEY) and IEEE 802.11r 
(Task group r) [5]. CAPWAP supports centralized management of APs. HOKEY 
extends the Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) architecture 
to support key deriving and distribution with involving full EAP authentication. 
802.11r depends upon passing credentials directly between APs for handover. 
Though CAPWAP takes very less time, it is more or less re-authentication with 
centralized Access Controller (AC), followed by key transfer to new Wireless 
Termination Points (WTP). HOKEY is successful in multidomains but it takes more 
communication time. Among these three (CAPWAP, HOKEY and 802.11r), 802.11r 
is more efficient in terms of communication overheads. It still has issues concerning 
the safe transfer of key between APs.
4.1 Comparisons of various handoff mechanisms
CAPWAP and HOKEY does not change the existing 802.11 frame structure. 
802.11r is a separate protocol and hence has different frame structure. All except 
CAPWAP scheme generates fresh session keys. Fresh traffic keys are generated by 
all the schemes. Communication overhead of KHC based handoff scheme is less as 
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compared to any other scheme. This handoff scheme shortens the handoff latency 
by initiating a key transfer process prior to moving to the new AP and performing 
handoff. It strengthens the security by (1) protecting STAs from re-associating to 
Malicious APs, (2) evolving fresh keys even during handshake, (3) authenticating 
all the frames during the handoff and, (4) safeguarding against DoS attacks and, 
(5) providing continuous authentication during communication.
5. Conclusions
This chapter discusses about the present WLAN security environment. It is 
clear that the WLAN security environment till date is dominated by WPA2 (IEEE 
802.11i) standard. Researchers have pointed out regarding length and complexity 
of the WPA2. The major point of concern in WPA2 is key refreshing mechanism 
i.e., 4-way handshake due to which the WLAN security is considered vulnerable. 
Researchers, hence target to reduce the length of this handshake while maintaining 
the security properties intact.
The chapter also studies other WLAN security mechanisms proposed by 
researchers and categories them into: (i) access control, (ii) per frame authentica-
tion and (iii) secure handoff mechanisms. It provides category wise comparative 
analysis of these mechanisms. Three mechanisms are considered in the access 
control category. Among them Key Hiding Communication (KHC) is the most 
attractive but it requires changes in the existing WLAN frame structure. Per frame 
category is further sub-categorized into: (a) per frame authentication mechanisms 
utilizing MIC and (b) lightweight per frame authentication mechanisms. For 
enhancing the security, most of the per frame authentication solutions rely on MIC 
for both authentication and integrity of frame. It is shown that this MIC verification 
involves computation time and large number of such verifications may result in 
computation DoS attack on the receiver. The researchers hence advocate separating 
the authentication and integrity parts in per frame authentication. The lightweight 
per frame authentication mechanism are though lightweight in nature but lacks 
security properties like key refreshing, secrecy and integrity. In this chapter, 
several handoff mechanisms for WLAN environment are also discussed and it is 
accomplished that none guarantees to maintain required level of security during the 
specified handoff time limits.
WLAN security is having a transformation from WPA2 to WPA3. WLAN 
security is strengthened in the upcoming standard i.e., WPA3. It is very early to 
comment on the effectiveness of WPA3 and it is evident that the existing WLAN 
devices will continue to use WPA2. The new upcoming WLAN devices will obvi-
ously follow the backward compatibility towards WPA2. Thus, researchers can still 
target to test the implementation of 802.11i with the novel ideas like MIC reduction, 
4-way handshake reduction and blockchain application in WLANs [33]. In wireless 
medium, per frame lightweight authentication mechanisms will prove an edge and 
in future, researchers may consider developing such solutions. For maintaining un-
interrupting communication quick, secure, accurate and secure handoff is the need 
of the hour. Hence, researchers in future may consider implementation of efficient 
and secure handoff mechanisms using WPA3.
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